

# Energy and Capital in a New-Keynesian Framework

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# Outline

Goals

Model

Household

Firms

- The Final Good Firm
- Intermediate Good Firms

Government

- GDP and GDP Deflator

Estimation

- Setting
- Estimation Results

Impulse Response Functions

# Outline

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# Goals

- This paper constructs a New-Keynesian model with oil in the production function and in consumption.
- The model's parameters are estimated using Bayesian techniques.
- We observe the impact of the oil shock in this economy.

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
Estimation

Impulse Response Functions


# Model Structure

Domestic Economy

# Model Structure




# Model Structure







# Model Structure




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
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
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
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
# Model Structure



# Model Structure



# Model Structure





Goals

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○○

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Impulse Response Functions

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## Household

Problem

$$\max \mathbb{E}_0 \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(C_t, L_t) \right], \quad 0 < \beta < 1$$

s. t

$$P_{e,t}C_{e,t} + P_{q,t}C_{q,t} + P_{k,t}I_t + B_t + T_t \\ \leq (1 + i_{t-1})B_{t-1} + W_tL_t + D_t + r_t^k P_{k,t}K_t$$

## Household

Problem

$$\max \mathbb{E}_0 \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(C_t, L_t) \right], \quad 0 < \beta < 1$$


s. t

$$P_{e,t} C_{e,t} + P_{q,t} C_{q,t} + P_{k,t} I_t + B_t + T_t \\ \leq (1 + i_{t-1}) B_{t-1} + W_t L_t + D_t + r_t^k P_{k,t} K_t$$


$$\Theta_x := x^{-x} (1-x)^{-(1-x)}$$

$$C_t := \Theta_x C_{e,t}^x C_{q,t}^{1-x}$$


## Household



## Household



## Household



# Optimization

Household's Optimal Expenditure Allocation

# Optimization

Household's Optimal Expenditure Allocation

$$\max_{C_{q,t}, C_{e,t}} P_{c,t} C_t$$

s. t

$$P_{c,t} C_t = P_{e,t} C_{e,t} + P_{q,t} C_{q,t}$$

$$C_t = \Theta_x C_{e,t}^x C_{q,t}^{1-x}$$



# Optimization

Household's Optimal Expenditure Allocation

$$\max_{C_{q,t}, C_{e,t}} P_{c,t} C_t$$

s. t

$$P_{c,t} C_t = P_{e,t} C_{e,t} + P_{q,t} C_{q,t}$$

$$C_t = \Theta_x C_{e,t}^x C_{q,t}^{1-x}$$

$$P_{q,t} C_{q,t} = (1-x) P_{c,t} C_t$$

$$P_{e,t} C_{e,t} = x P_{c,t} C_t$$

$$P_{c,t} = P_{e,t}^x P_{q,t}^{(1-x)}$$

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The Final Good Firm

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


# Final Good Producers

Final Good Firm




## Final Good Producers






## Final Good Producers





## Final Good Producers





## Final Good Producer Problem

Final Good Firm Profit Optimization

$$\max_{Q_t(i)} P_{q,t} Q_t - \int_0^1 P_{q,t}(i) Q_t(i) di$$

s. t

$$Q_t = \left( \int_0^1 Q_t(i)^{\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon}} di \right)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1}}$$

*i* demand

$$Q_t(i) = \left( \frac{P_{q,t}(i)}{P_{q,t}} \right)^{-\epsilon} Q_t$$

final good price

$$P_{q,t} = \left( \int_0^1 P_{q,t}(i)^{1-\epsilon} di \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}$$



# Intermediate Good Firms

Intermediate Firms





## Intermediate Good Firms

Intermediate Firms



$$Q_t(i) = A_t E_t(i)^{\alpha_e} L_t(i)^{\alpha_\ell} K_t(i)^{\alpha_k}$$
$$\alpha_e, \alpha_\ell, \alpha_k \geq 0, \quad \alpha_e + \alpha_\ell + \alpha_k \leq 1$$



## Intermediate Good Firms

Intermediate Firms

$$Q_t(i) = A_t E_t(i)^{\alpha_e} L_t(i)^{\alpha_l} K_t(i)^{\alpha_k}$$

$$\alpha_e, \alpha_l, \alpha_k \geq 0, \quad \alpha_e + \alpha_l + \alpha_k \leq 1$$


strategy of firm  $i$ : Marginal cost pricing behavior

FOC

Given:  $P_{e,t}$ ,  $P_{k,t}$ ,  $W_t$  and  $Q_t(i)$   
 Choses:  $E_t(i)$ ,  $L_t(i)$  and  $K_t(i)$



## Intermediate Good Firms





## Price Optimization

Price Maximization (at each date  $t$ ) (Calvo Price Setting)

$\theta$  cannot change

$$P_{q,t}(i) = P_{q,t-1}(i)$$

$1 - \theta$  can change

$$P_{q,t}(i) = P_{q,t}^o(i)$$

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GDP and GDP Deflator

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## GDP and GDP Deflator Definition

GDP  
(in value added)



$$P_{y,t}Y_t = P_{q,t}Q_t - P_{e,t}E_t$$

## GDP and GDP Deflator Definition

GDP  
(in value added)



$$P_{y,t} Y_t = P_{q,t} Q_t - P_{e,t} E_t$$

GDP Deflator



$$P_{y,t} = P_{c,t}$$




# Government

Government






# Government



# Government




Central Bank

Government


set

$$1 + i_t = \frac{1}{\beta} (\Pi_{q,t})^{\phi_\pi} \left( \frac{Y_t}{Y} \right)^{\phi_y} \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

# Government



# Government



# Government

$$\ln(G_{r,t}) = (1 - \rho_g)(\ln(\omega Q)) + \rho_g \ln(G_{r,t-1}) + \rho_{alk,g} e_{alk,t} + \rho_{ae,g} e_{ae,t} + e_{g,t}$$

Central Bank

Government

spending function

set

budget constraint


$$1 + i_t = \frac{1}{\beta} (\Pi_{q,t})^{\phi_\pi} \left( \frac{Y_t}{Y} \right)^{\phi_y} \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

$$(1 + i_{t-1})B_{t-1} + G_t = B_t + T_t$$


$$\Pi_{q,t} := \frac{P_{q,t}}{P_{q,t-1}}$$

$$\ln(\varepsilon_{i,t}) = \rho_i \ln(\varepsilon_{i,t-1}) + e_{i,t}$$

## Other Shocks



## Other Shocks



## Other Shocks

TFP

↓ AR(1)

$$\ln(A_t) = \rho_a \ln(A_{t-1}) + e_{a,t}$$



## Other Shocks

TFP

↓ AR(1)

$$\ln(A_t) = \rho_a \ln(A_{t-1}) + e_{a,t}$$

Price Markup

↓ ARMA(1,1)


$$\varepsilon_{p,t} = \rho_p \varepsilon_{p,t-1} + e_{p,t} - \nu_p e_{p,t-1}$$



# Definition of Equilibrium

Equilibrium

## Definition of Equilibrium



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**Estimation**

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# Data

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Observed  
Variable

Transformation

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invobs

$$\text{detrend} \left( \ln \left( \frac{PFI}{GDPDEF} \right) * 100 \right)$$

yobs

$$\text{detrend} \left( \ln \left( \frac{GDPC09}{LNSIndex} \right) * 100 \right)$$

labobs

$$\ln \left( \frac{\text{Averagehours} * CE16OVIndex}{LNSIndex} \right) * 100 - \text{mean} \left( \ln \left( \frac{\text{Averagehours} * CE16OVIndex}{LNSIndex} \right) * 100 \right)$$

infobs

$$\ln \left( \frac{GDPDEF}{GDPDEF(-1)} \right) * 100 - \text{mean} \left( \ln \left( \frac{GDPDEF}{GDPDEF(-1)} \right) * 100 \right)$$

iobs

$$\left( \ln \left( 1 + \frac{FEDFUND}{400} \right) - \text{mean} \left( \ln \left( 1 + \frac{FEDFUND}{400} \right) \right) \right) * 100$$

eobs

$$\ln \left( \frac{\text{TotalSAOil}}{LNSIndex} \right) * 100 - \text{mean} \left( \ln \left( \frac{\text{TotalSAOil}}{LNSIndex} \right) * 100 \right)$$


---

# Calibrated Parameters

$\beta$	$\delta$	$\omega$	$x$	$\epsilon$
0.99	0.025	0.18	0.023	8

Table : Calibrated Parameters

# Estimation Results - $\theta$ estimated

Parameter	Prior distribution	Posterior distribution				
		Mode	Mean	10%	90%	
<i><math>\theta</math> estimated</i>						
Capital elasticity	$\alpha_k$ IGamma(0.1,2)	0.3728	0.3599	0.3380	0.3822	
Labor elasticity	$\alpha_\ell$ IGamma(0.4,2)	0.6424	0.6411	0.6111	0.6745	
Oil elasticity	$\alpha_e$ IGamma(0.6,2)	0.1234	0.1254	0.1051	0.1460	
Inverse Frisch elasticity	$\phi$ IGamma(1.17,0.5)	0.6209	0.6308	0.4736	0.8019	
Taylor rule response to inflation	$\phi_\pi$ Normal(1.2,0.1)	1.2235	1.2253	1.0686	1.3558	
Taylor rule response to output	$\phi_y$ Normal(0.5,0.1)	0.8020	0.7882	0.6884	0.8876	
Calvo price parameter	$\theta$ Beta(0.5,0.1)	0.9812	0.9812	0.9380	0.9883	

Table : Prior and Posterior Distribution of Structural Parameters

# Estimation Results - $\theta$ estimated

Table : Prior and Posterior Distribution of Shock Parameters

Parameter	Prior distribution	Posterior distribution				
		Mode	Mean	10%	90%	
<i>Autoregressive parameters</i>						
Technology	$\rho_a$ Beta(0.5,0.2)	0.8619	0.8481	0.7960	0.8999	
Real oil price	$\rho_{se}$ Beta(0.5,0.2)	0.5761	0.5611	0.4629	0.6669	
Real capital price	$\rho_{sk}$ Beta(0.5,0.2)	0.7210	0.7080	0.6647	0.7524	
Price markup1	$\rho_p$ Beta(0.5,0.2)	0.9418	0.9283	0.8955	0.9640	
Price markup2	$\nu_p$ Beta(0.5,0.2)	0.9796	0.9760	0.9610	0.9913	
Government	$\rho_g$ Beta(0.5,0.2)	0.9058	0.8995	0.8712	0.9258	
Tech. in Gov.	$\rho_{ag}$ Beta(0.5,0.2)	0.6904	0.6127	0.3549	0.9472	
Monetary	$\rho_i$ Beta(0.5,0.2)	0.9399	0.9308	0.9035	0.9581	
<i>Standard deviations</i>						
Technology	$\sigma_a$ IGamma(1,2)	0.4361	0.4435	0.3901	0.4942	
Real oil price	$\sigma_{se}$ IGamma(1,2)	2.0000	1.9373	1.8652	2.000	
Real capital price	$\sigma_{sk}$ IGamma(1,2)	0.7740	0.7675	0.6379	0.8781	
Price markup	$\sigma_p$ IGamma(1,2)	0.1814	0.1854	0.1615	0.2094	
Government	$\sigma_g$ IGamma(1,2)	2.0000	1.7921	1.5508	1.9998	
Monetary	$\sigma_i$ IGamma(1,2)	0.5410	0.4566	0.3859	0.5205	



# Estimation Results - $\theta$ calibrated

Parameter	Prior distribution	Posterior distribution				
		Mode	Mean	10%	90%	
<i><math>\theta</math> calibrated</i>						
Capital elasticity	$\alpha_k$ IGamma(0.2,2)	0.3918	0.3809	0.3624	0.3989	
Labor elasticity	$\alpha_\ell$ IGamma(0.4,2)	0.5947	0.5966	0.5622	0.6305	
Oil elasticity	$\alpha_e$ IGamma(0.5,2)	0.1132	0.1177	0.0915	0.1434	
Inverse Frisch elasticity	$\phi$ IGamma(1.17,0.5)	1.2562	1.2625	0.9073	1.6069	
Taylor rule response to inflation	$\phi_\pi$ Normal(1.2,0.1)	1.5236	1.5307	1.3883	1.6722	
Taylor rule response to output	$\phi_y$ Normal(0.5,0.1)	0.0265	0.0214	0.0001	0.0402	

Table : Prior and Posterior Distribution of Structural Parameters

# Estimation Results - $\theta$ calibrated

Table : Prior and Posterior Distribution of Shock Parameters

Parameter	Prior distribution	Posterior distribution				
		Mode	Mean	10%	90%	
<i>Autoregressive parameters</i>						
Technology	$\rho_a$ Beta(0.5,0.2)	0.9605	0.9401	0.9033	0.9774	
Real oil price	$\rho_{se}$ Beta(0.5,0.2)	0.9934	0.9872	0.9754	0.9977	
Real capital price	$\rho_{sk}$ Beta(0.5,0.2)	0.8940	0.8924	0.8483	0.9314	
Price markup1	$\rho_p$ Beta(0.5,0.2)	0.9839	0.9621	0.9299	0.9971	
Price markup2	$\nu_p$ Beta(0.5,0.2)	0.1652	0.1711	0.0593	0.2758	
Government	$\rho_g$ Beta(0.5,0.2)	0.9373	0.9312	0.9061	0.9560	
Tech. in Gov.	$\rho_{ag}$ Beta(0.5,0.2)	0.7129	0.6589	0.3808	0.9541	
Monetary	$\rho_i$ Beta(0.5,0.2)	0.1914	0.2104	0.1249	0.2856	
<i>Standard deviations</i>						
Technology	$\sigma_a$ lGamma(1,2)	0.4538	0.4542	0.3981	0.5078	
Real oil price	$\sigma_{se}$ lGamma(1,2)	2.0000	1.9475	1.8842	2.000	
Real capital price	$\sigma_{sk}$ lGamma(1,2)	0.5459	0.5750	0.4722	0.6714	
Price markup	$\sigma_p$ lGamma(1,2)	0.4235	0.4645	0.2868	0.6602	
Government	$\sigma_g$ lGamma(1,2)	2.0000	1.8359	1.6425	2.000	
Monetary	$\sigma_i$ lGamma(1,2)	0.4778	0.4769	0.4062	0.54555	

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
Household

Firms


Government

Estimation

Impulse Response Functions



**IRF to a Real Oil Price Shock. Case:  $\theta$  Estimated**



IRF to a Real Oil Price Shock. Case:  $\theta$  Calibrated

# Optimization

$$1 = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ (1 + i_t) \frac{C_t}{C_{t+1}} \frac{P_{c,t}}{P_{c,t+1}} \right]$$

Euler

First Order Conditions

competitive labor supply sch.

$$\frac{W_t}{P_{c,t}} = C_t L_t^\phi$$

Fisher

$$1 = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{C_t}{C_{t+1}} \frac{P_{c,t}}{P_{c,t+1}} \frac{P_{k,t+1}}{P_{k,t}} (r_{t+1}^k + 1 - \delta) \right]$$

## No Ponzi Scheme

Transversality condition (no Ponzi Scheme)

$$\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E}_t \left( \frac{B_{t+k}}{\prod_{s=0}^{t+k-1} (1 + i_{s-1})} \right) \geq 0, \quad \forall t.$$

## Stochastic Discount Factor

1. from date  $t$  to date  $t + 1$

$$d_{t,t+1} := \frac{\beta U_C(C_{t+1}, L_{t+1})}{U_C(C_t, L_t)} \frac{P_{c,t}}{P_{c,t+1}}, \text{ i.e., } \frac{1}{1+i_t} = \mathbb{E}_t(d_{t,t+1}).$$

2. from date  $t$  to date  $t + k$

$$d_{t,t+k} := \prod_{s=t}^{t+k-1} \Delta_s^{s+1}, \text{ then, } d_{t,t+k} := \frac{\beta^k U_C(C_{t+k}, L_{t+k})}{U_C(C_t, L_t)} \frac{P_{c,t}}{P_{c,t+k}}.$$



# Cost Minimization

Cost minimization

F.O.C

$$mc_t(i) := \frac{W_t}{\alpha_\ell \frac{Q_t(i)}{L_t(i)}} = \frac{r_t^k P_{i,t}}{\alpha_k \frac{Q_t(i)}{K_t(i)}} = \frac{P_{e,t}}{\alpha_e \frac{Q_t(i)}{E_t(i)}}$$


$$mc_t(i) = F_t Q_t(i)^{\frac{1}{\alpha_e + \alpha_\ell + \alpha_k}} - 1$$

$$cost(Q_t(i)) =$$


$$(\alpha_e + \alpha_\ell + \alpha_k) F_t Q_t(i)^{\frac{1}{\alpha_e + \alpha_\ell + \alpha_k}}$$

$$F_t := \left( \frac{A \alpha_e^{\alpha_e} \alpha_\ell^{\alpha_\ell} \alpha_k^{\alpha_k}}{P_{e,t}^{\alpha_e} W_t^{\alpha_\ell} (r_t^k P_{i,t})^{\alpha_k}} \right)^{\frac{-1}{\alpha_e + \alpha_\ell + \alpha_k}}$$

## Price Optimization



## Calvo Price Setting



## Calvo Price Setting

Calvo Price Setting Problem

$$\max_{P_{q,t}(i)} \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \theta^k d_{t,t+k} [P_{q,t}(i) Q_{t,t+k}(i) - \text{cost}(Q_{t,t+k}(i))] \right]$$

s.t

$$Q_{t,t+k}(i) = \left( \frac{P_{q,t}(i)}{P_{q,t+k}} \right)^{-\epsilon} Q_{t+k}, \quad \forall k \geq 0$$

## Calvo Price Setting

Calvo Price Setting Solution

$$E_t \left[ \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \theta^k d_{t,t+k} Q_{t,t+k}^o \left( P_{q,t}^o - \mu^p mc_{t,t+k}^o \right) \right] = 0$$

$$mc_{t,t+k}^o := F_{t+k} (Q_{t,t+k}^o)^{\frac{1}{\alpha_e + \alpha_\ell + \alpha_k} - 1}$$

$$Q_{t,t+k}^o = \left( \frac{P_{q,t}^o}{P_{q,t+k}} \right)^{-\epsilon} Q_{t+k}$$