

### **EU ETS Reform:**

# « Partial » carbon price floor(s) and the market stability reserve


Université Paris-Dauphine July 4th, 2018 Simon Quemin and Raphael Trotignon Based on work with Anouk Faure, Boris Solier and Christian de Perthuis



- Adopted policy package contains 3 provisions to raise ambition
  - Increase in LRF & MSR implementation & invalidation of some EUAs in MSR
- ZEPHYR: Stylized modelling of the EU-ETS with inter-temporal cost minimization in discrete time for a representative agent

- Determination of EUA price, emission and banking paths
  - Comparison of relative impacts of alternative market design features

# MSR-induced impact on EUA price




• The MSR withholds EUAs which reduces supply and increases EUA prices

DAUPHINE

CHAIRE ECONOMIE CLIMAT


### MSR-induced impact on TNAC



• The MSR withholds EUAs which reduces the banking volume

DAUPHINE


CHAIRE ECONOMIE CLIMAT



• Limited potential to control for sustained differences in EUA demand

DAUPHINE

CHAIRE ECONOMIE CLIMAT



• Limited responsiveness in smoothing out short-term demand shocks

DAUPHINE

- Although the MSR increases the EUA price and reduces TNAC
  - it exhibits a limited demand shock smoothing out potential
  - and does not solve the governance issue (the amounts of EUA automatically removed from circulation are not directly linked to evaluations of policy interactions nor explicit carbon price targets)

- Room for considering additional supply-side control tools
  - Solution 1: EU-wide price floor (all sectors) e.g. auction reserve price
  - Solution 2: Coalition-wide price floor(s). Waterbed issue?

# Analysis of a unilateral carbon price floor

- CHAIRE E CONOMIE DU CLIMAT
- Study performed in 2015-2016 to evaluate the effect of a 30€/t unilateral carbon price floor imposed by France on domestic electricity sector emissions (Canfin-Grandjean-Mestrallet Commission)
- Using the **Zephyr-Electricity model** (short term dispatch)
  - combination of available generating technologies enabling electricity demand to be met at least cost on an hourly basis over a given year
  - given hourly available capacities, and hourly fuel and CO<sub>2</sub> prices
  - Representation of interconnection capacities in the form of « border technologies » to which marginal costs are assigned.
  - Outputs are electricity mix composition, electricity prices, and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.
- **Effect on the EU ETS** by introducing the lesser demand for EUAs from electricity plants in the Zephyr model market equilibrium

### The case of France in 2017: results

- CHAIRE ECONOMIE
- A €30/tCO<sub>2</sub> floor price raises the cost of domestic thermal power generation and leads to, at unchanged demand, a fall in production in favour of imports.
  - An increase of €2.6 to €3.4 in the price per MWh in the wholesale market as an annual average;
  - A reduction in domestic emissions of 3.5 to 10 MtCO<sub>2</sub> depending on relative prices of coal and gas, and an increase in import-related emissions of 3.7 to 6.2 MtCO<sub>2</sub>;
  - Limited substitution from domestic coal-fired to gas power plants due to cross-border trade.
  - The impact of the measure on the equilibrium of the EU ETS would be small because of the limited weight of French electricity sector emissions (around -0.5€/tCO<sub>2</sub>)

The case of an EU wide electricity sector floor

- CHAIRE ECONOMIE DU CLIMAT
- A European floor price of €30/tCO<sub>2</sub> improves the competitiveness of the French low-carbon electricity sector, which reduces imports to the benefit of production.
  - An €11.6 increase in the price per MWh
  - Little change in domestic emissions (with increased use of gas power plants and small decline in coal-fired plants) and a decline in import-related emissions;
  - The European electricity sector reduces its emissions by 125 MtCO<sub>2</sub> a year. Without adjusting the EU ETS cap, the price of EUA drops to zero for the non-electricity sector "waterbed effect");
  - The MSR is not able to prevent the price drop for the other sectors : It only absorbs 12% of additional induced surplus each year (60 Mt removed in 2020 against 500 Mt reduced emissions over 2017-2020)



- Emissions reductions induced by a higher carbon price on any subperimeter already in the ETS can make the carbon price drop to zero for the other sectors (waterbed effect)
- To « preserve » the market from this effect, one should identify, quantify, and remove from the effective cap the corresponding quantities of EUAs in a frequent, reactive, and transparent way (major governance issue)
- This preliminary analysis suggested that the **MSR would not be able to play this « protection » role**.
- Nevertheless, the **MSR can be used as a cancellation mechanism**, e.g. if an auction reserve price is implemented and the allowances removed from the market this way are placed in the MSR