



Fossil Resource Markets and Climate Change

15.01.2021

PRESENTATION IN THE LUNCH MEETING SEMINAR OF THE „CLIMATE ECONOMICS CHAIR“ PARIS

FRANZISKA HOLZ (DIW BERLIN AND NTNU)



BASED ON JOINT WORK WITH DAWUD ANSARI, MARIZA MONTES DE OCA LÉON, CLAUDIA KEMFERT, CHRIS HAUENSTEIN, RUUD EGGING AND OTHERS



Global carbon budget

In the absence of a technology to „decarbonize“ the emissions from fossil fuel use, the carbon budget sets an effective limit on the use of fossil resources to avoid catastrophic climate change:

<https://www.mcc-berlin.net/en/research/co2-budget.html>



→ ... each resource and countries / regions are differently affected

Globally



52%
of natural
gas
reserves




35%
of oil
reserves




88%
of coal
reserves

(Carbon Brief, based on
McGlade & Ekins 2015 in Nature)


Canada




US




Central and South America




Africa



Middle East




OECD Pacific




How much **oil**, **gas** and **coal** will we have to leave in the
ground to stay under 2 degrees of warming?


Europe




Former Soviet Union countries



China and India



Other developing Asian countries





How to phase our fossil fuels?

- Which strategies, which policies can be effective and how?
- Which obstacles, fundamental market structures, governance schemes, etc. to consider?
- Which assets in the markets' value chains are at risk of stranding?
- Market-driven vs. policy-driven phase-out?

→ Country- and fuel-specific analyses and strategies are required

- Mostly – but not exclusively – based on numerical modeling with large-scale global, sectoral models
 - Global Gas Model
 - COALMOD-World
 - Multimod
 - Oilmod

Fossil Resource Markets and Climate Policy:

Stranded Assets, Expectations and the Political Economy of Climate Change

10/ 2018 – 09/2021 “Economics of Climate Change”

FoReSee




ifo INSTITUTE
Leibniz Institute for Economic Research
at the University of Munich

HUMBOLDT-UNIVERSITÄT ZU BERLIN
Resource Economics

DIW BERLIN

FoReSee studies...

- the interplay between climate policies and participants in fossil fuel & financial markets
- how policies can overcome inertia of the energy system without excessive costs
- redistribution of rents in sectors and countries vulnerable to asset stranding
- private actors' responses to current and expected (uncertain) climate policies
- policy designs to correct inefficient market-side responses



- WP1: Inter-fuel policies and markets
- WP2: Carbon bubble empirics
- WP3: Climate and resource curse
- - WP4: Fossil lobbies
- WP5: Beliefs and asset pricing

Combined
excellence in
methods

Econometrics

Game theory

Operations research

New political economy

Stakeholder dialogue

Some examples to be discussed today




1. Multi-fuel perspective: stranded assets risk in coal, oil, natural gas differs by region
2. Coal: market-driven phase-out in the U.S. (despite political resistance...)
3. Natural gas: no need for new infrastructure in Europe such as German LNG terminals and Nord Stream 2
4. Oil: phasing out gasoline subsidies in Latin America (empirical research)

Stranded assets across fuel markets

GLOBAL MULTI-FUEL MODEL SCENARIOS




Stranded assets are "assets [that] suffer from unanticipated or premature write-offs, downward revaluations or are converted to liabilities" ([Caldecott et al., 2013](#), p. 7)



Multimod: a global multi-fuel resource market model

FoRESEE



Multimod: regional effects of global climate scenarios

FoRESEE




Business as usual

Conflicting interests in a tense environment lead to an ambiguous future energy system with fossil fuels and renewables side by side



Survival of the Fittest

Nationalist / regionalist world without regard to climate change and decarbonization ends in large-scale climate catastrophes



Revived global cooperation and societal commitments enable markets to turn civilisation, society, and growth green

Green Cooperation

Technology-centred world with sudden technological advances manages to curb emissions but fails in deep decarbonisation and energy transition

ClimateTech


Ansari et al. (2019, ERSS)




Federal Ministry
of Education
and Research

DIW-REM Scenarios: Global electricity generation and primary energy


FoRESEE




Business as Usual








Green Cooperation



Survival of the Fittest



ClimateTech




— Business as Usual - - - Survival of the Fittest - - - Green Cooperation ClimateTech

Regional, fuel-specific stranded assets risk indicator

Index:

$$I_{s,f} = \sqrt{\Delta_{\text{avg}}^{\text{max}} \text{util}_{s,f} * \text{share}_{s,f}}$$

- a) How vulnerable is a certain country/region to a loss of income from production of a particular fuel AND
- b) how robust is the infrastructure capacity use of a particular fuel across scenarios?



Coal markets


MARKET-DRIVEN PHASE-DOWN IN THE USA

The COALMOD-World model FoReSEE




Open source partial equilibrium model (https://www.diw.de/en/diw_01.c.599753.en/models.html)

- Large-scale multi-period model of (competitive) steam coal market
 - CoalMod-World (Haftendorn et al. 2012, Holz et al. 2015, 2016)
- Profit-maximizing players with specific constraints in MCP
 - Producers and exporters
- Market clearing via inverse demand functions
- Model features:
 - Mine mortality effects on costs and production capacities
 - Endogenous investment in production and export capacities
 - Substitution between imports and domestic production
- 45 consumption nodes (C), 22 producers (P), and 21 exporters (E)
- Multi-period model with yearly equilibria in 5-years-steps from 2015 to 2050




Source: Adapted from Holz et al. (2016)



Global coal phase-out?

FoRESEE




U.S. coal sector

- The electricity sector accounts for about 93% of U.S. domestic coal consumption
- Traditionally important role of coal in U.S. electricity generation, but sharp decrease in last decade: 49% → 30% (2007-2017)

Structural economic factors for decline

- Competition from renewables (RES) with declining cost
- Competition from cheap gas due to shale gas boom
- Tightened environmental regulations

Discussed in more detail in Mendelevitch, Hauenstein and Holz (2019, *Climate Policy*)



Source: EIA 2018


Future of coal in the U.S.?

EMF 34 („N. Am. Energy markets“)

FoReSEE



Surprisingly, the decreasing trend of coal and its drivers are hardly taken into account in North American energy market models (e.g., in EMF34), in particular not by the EIA



Hauenstein & Holz (2021)

→ We propose a scenario that accounts for the downward pressure on U.S. coal



U.S. coal trend in a scenario with „bottom-up data“

FoRESEE



Our own scenario (“bottom_up”):

- Future U.S. coal demand calculated from U.S. coal-fired power generation unit data (source: EIA) with average life-time assumption 60 years and constant capacity factor 0.5 (and sensitivity analyses)
- Global coal demand growth rate from IEA WEO 2019 *Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS)*
→ *No new coal-fired power plants, no excessive capacity factor increase*



Avoiding domestic asset stranding by turning to global markets?

FoRESEE



Exports can alleviate domestic pressure on U.S. coal mining if

- West coast export terminals are allowed (scenarios „_ports“)
- and global demand is sustained (IEA WEO STEPS)

Unrealistic !




Figure: U.S. coal exports 2020-2050 and their destination in Mt per year

Beyond stranded assets: employment

FoRESEE




Figure: Direct coal mining jobs in the U.S. coal regions

- There need to be policy solutions for decreasing employment in coal mining across the U.S.
 - Even high productivity Powder River Basin will be affected by significant job losses (more than 50% in „bottom_up“ scenario)
- Just Transition approach includes workers, not just companies
- However, coal dependency had led to resource curse in the past
- Coal regions need to seize this opportunity to overcome the curse



Natural gas markets

GLOBAL AND EUROPEAN INFRASTRUCTURE BETWEEN DASH FOR
LNG AND SUPPLY SECURITY IN A CLIMATE-CONSTRAINED WORLD

U.S. LNG exports: Freedom gas to Europe?

FoReSEE



Figure 1: Existing U.S. LNG export terminals and their capacities in bcm/year

Source: Own figure based on FERC North American LNG Export Terminals (Released November 21, 2019, <https://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus-act/lng.asp>)

Egging, Holz, Czempinski, work in progress




Figure 2: US LNG exports 2015-2019, in bcm/year

Note: Countries receiving largest U.S. LNG exports are indicated in the chart.

Source: Own figure based on EIA U.S. Natural Gas Exports by Country (Released May 29, 2020) www.eia.gov

The role of LNG in Europe in the last decade




Figure 3: LNG exports to the EU 2010–2018, in bcm per year


Source: Own figure based on BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2011, 2016-2019)

Egging, Holz, Czempinski,
work in progress

- Small share of total imports (< 25%)
- Main problem: pipeline transport from LNG import terminals to consumers across Europe
- National natural gas markets in Europe are still quite segmented
- However, hub development in some places has increased liquidity and made these markets attractive to LNG suppliers

2018	TRADED GAS HUBS CHURN RATES*				
HUB	2008	2011	2016	2017	2018
TTF	3.3	13.9	57.1	54.3	70.9
NBP	14.4	19.8	22.1	23.9	16.9
VTP	CEGH 2.4	CEGH 2.2	5.7	5.3	6.9
NCG	0.4	1.8	4.0	3.4	3.8
GPL		0.8	2.5	2.6	2.8

Heather (2019),
OIES



- Multiple players:
 - Producers
 - Traders
 - Pipeline operators
 - LNG liquefiers
 - LNG regasifiers
 - Storage operators
- Net present value optimization 2015-2050
- Profit maximization problems under constraints, linked by market-clearing conditions

Scenarios for U.S. LNG exports to Europe


FoRESEE



Scenario	Scenario description	Scenario implementation
„Base Case“	Stable natural gas demand in Europe and continuous demand increase elsewhere	IEA New Policies Scenario 2018 (World Energy Outlook) demand growth rates in the world regions, EU Reference Scenario 2016 for European countries
“Trump”	Financial support to U.S. LNG exports to Europe and sanctions on finishing Nordstream 2 pipeline	Shipping costs U.S. to Europe decreased by 0-100%; Nordstream 2 delayed by ten years
“Putin”	Disruption of all Russian exports to Europe	Russian trader not allowed to sell gas to EU and Switzerland
“Altmaier”	Support to LNG import terminals in Germany	Capital costs and/or operational costs of regasification terminals in Germany decreased by 0-100%
“Jinping”	Support to LNG import terminals in China	Capital costs and/or operational costs of regasification terminals in China decreased by 0-100%

Results: EU supply is diversified and hardly affected by restrictions/subsidies

FORSEE



Egging, Holz, Czempinski,
work in progress

Figure 6: EU supply mix by supplying region, Base Case and selected scenarios 2020-2050, in bcm per year

Note: The numbers succeeding the scenario name indicate the applied percentage of the Base Case cost data (i.e., the opposite of the subsidy rate). In the Altmaier and Jinping scenarios, the first number refers to the operational costs; the second number refers to the investment costs in regasification capacity. In the Trump scenarios, the number is the share of Base Case LNG transportation costs between U.S. liquefaction and European regasification nodes. E.g., "100" means 100% of the Base Case cost, hence, a 0% subsidy on the costs.

LNG terminals in Germany? Only with subsidies and...




Figure 11: German LNG imports from the U.S. in different scenarios in bcm per year

Note: The numbers succeeding the scenario name indicate the applied percentage of the Base Case cost data (i.e., the opposite of the subsidy rate). In the Altmaier scenarios, the first number refers to the operational costs; the second number refers to the investment costs in regasification capacity.

... at the expense of Norway





Figure 12: Germany Supply Breakdown in the Base Case and selected scenarios in bcm/year

Europe in a global competition for U.S. LNG?

FoRESEE



Egging, Holz, Czempinski,
work in progress

Figure 7: North American exports and their destination regions in selected scenarios 2020-2050, in bcm per year

Note: The numbers succeeding the scenario name indicate the applied percentage of the Base Case cost data (i.e., the opposite of the subsidy rate). In the Altmaier and Jinping scenarios, the first number refers to the operational costs; the second number refers to the investment costs in regasification capacity. In the Trump scenarios, the number is the share of Base Case LNG transportation costs between U.S. liquefaction and European regasification nodes. E.g., "100" means 100% of the Base Case cost, hence, a 0% subsidy on the costs.




Figure 8. Price trends for selected countries in the Base Case (€/ 1000 cm)

- Price divergence between Europe and (East) Asia persists
- The widening price gap makes Asia relatively more attractive for global LNG supplies than Europe over time
- Due to strongly increasing demand in China, Chinese prices catch up with East Asian prices over time

Assets in the global natural gas sector




Figure 1: Global liquefaction capacities 2020 in bcm/year (Source: GIIGNL, 2020)
Total: ~ 580 bcm





Figure 2: Global regasification capacities 2020 in bcm/year (Source: GIIGNL, 2020)
Total: ~ 1250 bcm


Scenarios for the global natural gas sector

Figure 1: Global supply in bcm. Source: GGM results




Egging & Holz,
work in progress

Figure 2: European natural gas demand in SET-Nav pathways and EU Reference Demand (2016). Source: Egging et al. (2019)



Need for global gas phase-down scenarios because the drivers are the same elsewhere than in Europe

Outlook: Stranded assets in hydrogen infrastructure?

- Natural gas industry promises  as „bridge“ to decarbonized economy
 - Fear of stranding natural gas assets
 - Fear of loosing business models and revenues
- Germany discusses Hydrogen Network Development Plan, following the role model of natural gas
- But: will there really be a wide-spread need for hydrogen or will it be the (expensive) fuel for those applications that cannot be decarbonized otherwise (e.g. electrified)?

Hydrogen will be a key contributor to the energy transition. Here's what Equinor is doing.



- 1 Hydrogen produced at scale to replace natural gas.
- 2 CO₂ captured and stored in safe offshore sites.



Oil markets


PHASE-OUT OF FOSSIL FUEL SUBSIDIES IN LATIN AMERICA

How to phase out fossil-fuel subsidies ?

- Phasing-out FFS is compelling to fight climate change
- Despite >40 attempts 2015-17, FFS level is at 2014 levels

Fossil fuel subsidies in Latin America

- Wide-spread use of gasoline and diesel subsidies, often targeting consumer prices
 - Phase-out approach differs by country
- Can we learn something on the least controversial way of phasing out fossil fuel subsidies?
- Presidential regimes – Presidential approval can be measured over time
 - Build *Synthetic Control Model(s)* to compare regimes with different subsidy phase-out approaches to hypothetical non-phase-out




Montes de Oca Leon and Holz, work in progress

Empirical evidence on Mexico and Bolivia


FoRESEE



Subsidy removal and approval in Mexico



Subsidy removal and approval in Bolivia



Presidential approval is 10% and 22% lower than it had been without FFS reform in Mexico and Bolivia, respectively

→ Gradual reform seems to be politically less costly than on-off reform with large price hike

Here: Pool of controls includes all LAC countries

Montes de Oca Leon and Holz, work in progress 36



Conclusions

Conclusions:

Need for much more research!

- Tight carbon budget and political commitments (Paris Agreement, EU Green Deal, etc.) make it inevitable to find quick solutions to reduce emissions from fossil fuel use
 - Country- and fuel-specific approaches can help find effective policy approaches to reduce fossil fuel supply, use and emissions
- ↔ Country- and fuel-specific constraints and fundamental structures need to be taken into account, e.g. in market-specific numerical models
- Strong decrease of renewable costs and renewable integration costs makes fossil fuel phase-out already economical in some countries, similar trend in more countries
- Risk of asset stranding in fossil sectors which can trigger political resistance, compensation requests and adverse economic effects

Thank you for your attention! Looking forward to the discussion!

FRANZISKA HOLZ

FHOLZ@DIW.DE

WWW.DIW.DE/CV/DE/FHOLZ

- Dawud Ansari and Franziska Holz (2019): Anticipating Global Energy, Climate and Policy in 2055: Constructing Qualitative and Quantitative Narratives. *Energy Research & Social Science*, Vol. 58, pp. 101250.
- Dawud Ansari and Franziska Holz (2020): Between Stranded Assets and Green Transformation: Fossil-Fuel-Producing Developing Countries Towards 2055. *World Development*, Vol. 130, pp. 104947.
- Dawud Ansari, Franziska Holz, and Hashem al-Kuhlani (2020): Energy Outlooks Compared: Global and Regional Insights. *Economics of Energy and Environmental Policy*, Vol. 9 (1), pp. 21-42.
- Ben Caldecott, James Tilbury and Yuge Ma (2013): Stranded Down Under? Environment-related factors changing China's demand for coal and what this means for Australian coal assets.
- Ruud Egging, Pedro Crespo del Granado, Franziska Holz, Peter Kotek, and Borbala Tóth (2019): The role of natural gas in an electrifying Europe. SET-Nav Issue Paper (www.set-nav.eu).
- Christian Hauenstein and Franziska Holz (2021): The U.S. Coal Sector between Shale Gas and Renewables: Last Resort Coal Exports? *Energy Policy*, Vol. 149, pp. 112097.
- Franziska Holz, Clemens Haftendorn, Roman Mendelevitch, and Christian von Hirschhausen (2016): A Model of the International Steam Coal Market (COALMOD-World). *DIW Data Documentation 85*. DIW Berlin, Berlin.
- Franziska Holz and Claudia Kemfert (2020): „No Need for New Natural Gas Pipelines and LNG Terminals in Europe“. DIW Focus 6. DIW Berlin, Berlin.
- Christophe McGlade and Paul Ekins (2015): The geographical distribution of fossil fuels unused when limiting global warming to 2 °C. *Nature*, Vol. 517, p.187–190.
- Roman Mendelevitch, Christian Hauenstein, and Franziska Holz (2019): The Death Spiral of Coal in the U.S. Will Changes in U.S. Policy Turn the Tide? *Climate Policy*, Vol. 19 (10), pp. 1310-1324.


Additional slides

FRANZISKA HOLZ

15.1.2021

Scenarios: Perspectives on global energy futures



FORSEE




- Generating an independent, interdisciplinary, qualitative-quantitative energy outlook to 2050: The DIW-REM Outlook
- Translating scenarios into stranded asset risks for individual regions
- Assessing and comparing prominent outlooks

Interested to hear more? Listen to the IAEE Webinar from November 26, 2020:
https://www.iaee.org/en/webinars/webinar_ebers5.aspx

Figure 1: Stranded asset index
Source: Ansari et al. (2019)




Ansari, D., Holz, F., & Al-Kuhlani, H. (2019). *Energy, climate, and policy towards 2055: An interdisciplinary energy outlook (DIW-REM outlook)* (No. 139). DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt.




Ansari, D., & Holz, F. (2020). Between stranded assets and green transformation: Fossil-fuel-producing developing countries towards 2055. *World Development*, 130, 104947.



Ansari, D., & Holz, F. (2019). Anticipating global energy, climate and policy in 2055: Constructing qualitative and quantitative narratives. *Energy Research & Social Science*, 58, 101250.




Ansari, D., Holz, F., & Al-Kuhlani, H. (2020). Energy Outlooks Compared: Global and Regional Insights. *Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy*, 9(1).



The DIW-REM outlook: Multimod


A numerical multi-fuel, multi-sector model of global energy and resource markets:

- Resource producers / transporters, power plant owners, and service providers maximise their profits in (im-)perfect competition
- Consumers maximise their utility




The DIW-REM outlook

FoReSEE




DIW-REM Outlook Indicators

FoReSEE




Scenario “Business-as-usual”

Final global energy demand



Electricity fuel mix



2020

- Prolonged localised conflicts → lower climate change mitigation efforts

- Coexistence of fossil fuels and renewables

- US catch up under a new, politically liberal administration
- Deployment of electric vehicles, renewable efficiency gains, CCS
- Still: Failure to achieve 2 deg C target leads to catastrophes


2050

Scenario “Survival of the Fittest”


FoRESEE



Final global energy demand



Electricity fuel mix



2020

- Int. governance is replaced by a multi-polar order, expanding conflict

- Efforts towards energy transition low, mostly in China and the EU
- Investments (FDI) crowded out by protectionist policies

2050


- Carbon budget filled by 2040, catastrophes, further push for isolationism
- Exploding adaptation costs, only affordable to rich nations

Scenario “Green Cooperation”


FoRESEE



Final global energy demand



Electricity fuel mix



2020

- Rapid decrease of (armed) conflict in key regions, strong global order



- Dual objective: Poverty eradication and CC mitigation
- Population growth and urbanisation are met with green leapfrogging
- Large R&D investments drive renewables' gains and new technologies

2050


- Achievement of the 2 °C target

Scenario “Climate Tech”

Final global energy demand



Electricity fuel mix



2020

- BaU, but promising technological advances lead politics to neglect mitigation

- Growth and urbanisation result in increasing emissions in early decades
- Carbon budget approached but deployment of new technologies then starts
- New technologies allow for more time/emissions (despite complications)

2050

- 2°C target achieved, incl. with negative emissions, but delayed transition