





COMPLIANCE IN FISHING REGULATIONS: A SOCIAL NORMS PERSPECTIVE.


MOTIVATION

Saiko is an illegal fishing activity in Ghana, where the industrial trawlers specifically target the small species and sell them to artisanal fishers.

Disastrous consequences on the marine ecosystem & the labour market of fishermen. Fishing activities possibly influenced by social norms (common accepted behaviour in a specific society) and moral motivation (Gezelius, 2002; Dresdner et al,

RESEARCH QUESTION

 What role do social norms play in the decision to violate the fishing regulation?



DATA

2015).


Survey on artisanal fishers in the Western and Central regions in Ghana (Akpalu, 2023), carried out in 2020.

- Household and individual characteristics;
- Fishing activities (Artisanal fishing, Saiko retail);
- 410 fishermen.

METHODOLOGY

Hybrid Choice Model (HCM): Discrete choice modeling framework of participation to Saiko fishing;

• Integration an unobservable social norms (Latent Variable) of fishing behaviour, based on observed attitudinal indicators.



Fishermen with attitudes represented by a positive fishing social norm (against Saiko retail) are likely to be older, new in the community, less educated, without any important position in the community, and with lower expenses.

- The most important indicator of the positive fishing social norm appears to be the fisherman opinion on other fishermen's ban.
- Fishermen with a high social norm have a lower probability of participating to Saiko retail; age is negatively associated, price of slabs (potential gains) positively associated with the probability of participating.

CONCLUSION

- The social norm channel is relevant to this explain non-compliance Guilty community, through feeling, Opinion on others' ban, Fairness sentiment.
- Willingness to improve compliance in an environmental regulation may consider bottom-up policies that play on peer effect and special features such as the hierarchical structure of the community.

RELATED LITERATURE

- Akpalu, W., Vondolia, G.K., Adom, P.K., Peprah, A., 2023. Passive Participation in Illegal Fishing and the Welfare of Fishmongers in a Developing Country.
- Dresdner, J., Chávez, C., Barriga, O., 2015. Compliance in Artisanal Fisheries: Do Morality, Legitimacy, and Peer Effects Matter? Marine Resource Economics 30, 349–370.
- Gezelius, S.S., 2002. Do Norms Count? State Regulation and Compliance in a Norwegian Fishing Community.

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