Tirole and E. Ostrom, recipients of the Nobel Prize in economics in 2014 and 2009 respectively, both theorize the climate as a common good. However, Benjamin Coriat, author of The Common good, the climate and the market: a reply to Jean Tirole (“Le bien commun, le climat et le marché : réponse à Jean Tirole”) [1], points out that the two economists do not share the same definition of the commons, leading them to very different conclusions on the actions needed to mitigate climate change.
In the first chapter, the author first describes how J. Tirole’s defines the notion of the commons. While J. Tirole had never addressed the issue of the commons before, he published a book entitled Economics of the common good (“Economie du bien commun”) [2] in 2016. Despite the title, B. Coriat notes that the commons are only discussed on rare occasions and that bibliographic references to the literature of the commons are sparse. More specifically, the author points out that E. Ostrom’s work is cited only once in the entire book, although she received the Nobel Prize for her theory of the commons.
In the rest of this chapter, the author aims to prove that J. Tirole’s 2016 book is only a reformulation of his previous work on the theory of contracts, incentives, and regulation. B. Coriat thus begins by describing the solution suggested by the latter to mitigate climate change, which consists in establishing a global carbon market to respond to market failures. B. Coriat then gives many different examples to prove how such a solution is not adapted from a theoretical, ethical, or an operational perspective. These examples are arguments to support the author’s main thesis: J. Tirole’s economy of the common good is simply an economy of well-being in the classical sense, and the “veil of ignorance” that the latter uses to justify this definition is only an illusion.
The second chapter is dedicated to the theory of the commons as described by E. Ostrom. The author begins by showing how E. Ostrom’s contribution is relevant to climate change mitigation (contrary to what J. Tirole states in his book). Above all the author demonstrates how much it differs from what J. Tirole has advocated for, both in terms of the analysis of the problem and of the solutions needed to resolve it. For instance, he discusses the Rodotà Commission in Italy and the Citizens’ Climate Convention in France to show that the notion of commons is relevant not only in theory but also in practice. He illustrates how each of these initiatives relates to the notion of the commons.
The reader will therefore remember the following elements when reading this book. On the one hand, the author is convincing in demonstrating that treating the climate as a common good (from the definition of E. Ostrom) is relevant. He clearly summarizes the elements of the theory of the commons: it requires polycentric governance based on (i) multiple scales and coordination, (ii) deliberation and (iii) the existence of communities. On the other hand, the author strongly criticizes J. Tirole’s the approach. More precisely, he criticizes his choice to use the term “commons” and to define it in his own way, as that term has already been widely defined and documented. On this point, the author lines up arguments and examples, and the reader can only deplore J. Tirole’s choice not to mention the literature on the commons that existed prior to his work. Nevertheless, it is up to the reader to make up their mind about the solution proposed by J. Tirole for mitigating climate change and to determine whether it should be a common good in the sense of E. Ostrom or J. Tirole.
Adrien Nicolle, PhD student, Economic deployment of carbon capture and storage infrastructures.
[1] Coriat, B. (2021). Le bien commun, le climat et le marché: réponse à Jean Tirole. Éditions les Liens qui libèrent.
[2] Tirole, J. (2016). Économie du bien commun. Presses universitaires de France.